When FIFA whittled the Asian candidates for the next World Cup down to the final stages, the weakest referee of the ten remaining in the race was Omar Al-Ali from UAE. It seems to me that Al-Ali benefitted a lot from the deficiencies shown by his compatriot, Adel Al-Naqbi, in the Paris Olympics. Al-Naqbi refereed poorly in the Hispanic derby group stage match between Spain and the Dominican Republic, and I would have rejected his performance in this game - indeed, it seems FIFA's internal assessment mirrors my own, because Al-Naqbi has not refereed a fixture in a FIFA competition since that afternoon.
Al-Ali's refereeing was, in my opinion, comparably unimpressive: he didn't leave a good impression in the easiest match of the last Gulf Cup, the dead-rubber between Bahrain and Yemen, and displayed significant weaknesses when handling the third place playoff of the Egytian Super Cup last season. Indeed, the on-field review which happened in this match is among the most remarkable episodes that I saw in all refereeing (certainly by WC-candidate officials!) all season: Al-Ali took over three minutes at the monitor to assess a handball penalty incident (clip here) before, finally, deciding to award a penalty. It should be clear that Mikael is not the person who takes a belittling approach to matches that seem exotic to a European audience, but I would underline - this incredible indecision took place during the third place playoff of the Egyptian Super Cup between Ceramica Cleopatra and FC Pyramids in a near-empty stadium.
One could continue to listing practical refereeing reasons as to why it is inappropriate to have chosen Omar Al-Ali as a main referee, but that is by the by - FIFA (and all refereeing bodies!) make technical assessments about the level of specific referees that are disagreeable, though they have very rarely done so in this World Cup. The reason why this appointment is so questionable is such: it very much appears to implicate the relationship between the FIFA Director of Refereeing, Massimo Busacca, and the United Arab Emirates FA. Busacca has regularly used the domestic competitions in that country to conduct personal observations about referees - for instance, the cup semifinals refereed by Herrera and Falcon respectively in that country in March of this year (spoken of in 'Who will FIFA choose?') were both personally supervised by Busacca in the stadium. The referees manager from Switzerland is said to be a frequent visitor to the United Arab Emirates, and accordingly planned to meet the European candidate referees for the next World Cup in Dubai, before geopolitical affairs necessitated a change in location last March.
I don't want to write something out of turn here, but not the wildest imagination is required to work out how this all works. In my opinion, the 'conflict of interests' here is writ rather large. In terms of level, it is absolutely indefensible to have promoted Al-Ali over the other two Asian referees who are being used as support officials. Busacca is too knowledgeable a person in refereeing, having overseen a very shrewd and competent composition of the overall referees' list for this World Cup, not to know that himself. So, the only conclusion one can draw is such: the Swiss referee manager has used his position to award a 'freebee' to the country in which he often works from. This is not the first affair under this heading, either. Our friends at Arbitro Internacional reported that Busacca tried in 2018 to impose as referee of the dead-rubber match between Panama and Tunisia, Abdulrahman Al-Jassim from Qatar (referee at this World Cup), who had only been nominated as a VAR for that tournament. The request was ultimately blocked.
Being a referees' manager in the 2020s is an incredibly difficult job, and one would be hard-pressed to find anyone who doesn't share a large degree of sympathy for the position that Busacca and Collina find themselves in, but I would be very firm on them with regards this appointment: Mr Busacca, it should not work like this.
It goes without saying, but surely worth reiterating, that I wish all referees well, always, and that I would be the first person who would be delighted if Omar Al-Ali handles New Zealand against Egypt in a good manner, and technically justifies his 'promotion' to being one of the main referees in this World Cup.
A very thought provoking and interesting analysis Mikael. I always enjoy reading your contributions
ReplyDeleteI do have a question. Do you think that Al-Ali may "get away" with that fact that as long as he doesn't have a "disaster" it will seen as a test passed?
Considering it's two of the countries that "less" eyes will be on most of Europe will be in bed. Does that allow for greater flexibility in appointing him over say another candidate. Equally I wish him well and hope he delivers a good performance.
Thank you Mikael, I largely agree with the points made in your article.
ReplyDeleteOn the AFC side, the core issue here isn’t really about one referee or one appointment—it’s about how the whole pathway to the top level is being shaped. From what I’ve seen over the years, for referees, the most important thing is ‘where you from’ instead of ‘what’s your ability’.
What stands out quite clearly is the consistent advantage for referees from West Asia, especially Qatar, UAE, and Saudi Arabia. When candidates are discussed, those names always seem to be in a “priority lane,” even when their actual performances aren’t necessarily stronger than others in Asia. At the same time, referees from other regions don’t seem to get the same level of protection or tolerance—one or two average games can seriously damage their chances, while others can survive much worse performances and still stay in the pipeline.
From a long-term AFC watching perspective, I’d roughly agree with the general level breakdown that people often mention. Apart from Faghani, and a very small group like Tantashev, Al-Kaf and Ma Ning who are clearly top-level in terms of actual refereeing quality, the next tier would include Makhadmeh, Al-Turais, and Araki—solid referees. Then you have referees like Al-Jassim or Al-Ali, who in my view simply haven’t shown enough consistency or game control to fully justify regular WC-level appointments.
And honestly, if they weren’t from federations like Qatar or the UAE, it’s hard to imagine they would be getting the same level of opportunities at all. That imbalance becomes even more obvious when you look at how different tournaments are used as “evaluation platforms.”
The 2025 Arab Cup is probably the clearest example of this.
Take Makhadmeh, for instance. In his first group-stage match, he made almost the same kind of mistake he had already made before in the Tokyo Olympics—going to OFR and still sticking with a clearly wrong YC decision. Under a strict merit-only logic, that kind of repetition would normally cost you your tournament. But instead, he was given another group match, managed to reset, performed well, and basically used that second chance to rebuild trust. That ultimately played a big role in keeping him in the wider World Cup 2026 conversation.
On the other hand, Al-Jassim was kind of “managed” differently throughout the tournament. He was held back and only came in late in the group stage, then again delivered a performance that raised questions. Yet after that, he still ended up being appointed to officiate the FIFA Intercontinental Cup, and from the post-match ceremony you could clearly see how much Infantino seems to like him. Benítez is another example—despite never really producing convincing performances at a consistent level, he still ended up getting semi-final appointments.
Now compare that with Ma Ning. In the same Arab Cup, he basically had to “go all in” from the start. His group-stage performances were very strong across the board, and in my view he genuinely outperformed several referees who ended up receiving more stable long-term backing. But even with that, the outcome is still quite striking: he only got a single AR slot for the 2026 World Cup. No on-field referee role, just one assistant referee appointment, can only officiate one GS match.
Then you look at someone like Al-Ali, and the contrast becomes even more obvious. To reach the same level of opportunity, the “requirement” seems much lower. In practical terms, it looks like he just needed to be slightly better than Al-Naqbi in terms of form, avoid major mistakes, and stay clean in the evaluation cycle. And even more strikingly, he didn’t even need to officiate any FIFA tournament in 2025 to remain in contention for a World Cup on-field spot.
That difference in pathway is exactly why a lot of people feel the system is uneven. It’s not just about whether individuals are good or bad—it’s about how much performance you actually need, and how many chances you’re given before decisions are made.